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In 1989 the New Zealand government introduced a dramatic new policy initiative in 
to reconfigure the education system, particularly in its pre-tertiary institutional 
structures.  Its themes centre around notions of economic rationalism (the pursuit of 
an ‘efficient’ use of educational resources inputs through the creation of a quasi-
competitive ‘market’), managerialism (in imposing measurable and auditable 
‘outputs’) and a skepticism of the old model arising out of public choice theory (the 
suspicion that teachers and bureaucrats are motivated by self-interest rather than the 
public good).  The ability of Economics to ‘colonise’ education appears to echo 
similara moves by the Law and Economics school in legal theory.  This paper 
describes in broad terms the new institutional forms of ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’ and 
looks to some of the confused / confusing ideological roots of the new model in terms 
of various versions of liberalism.  
 




The New Zealand economy has been through a radical restructuring, commencing in 
1984 and following a so-called ‘neoliberal’ philosophy of economic rationalism.  A 
market-based model has been imposed on most public sector activities, including the 
provision of education, together with a new ethos of managerialism.  As a corollary, 
earlier liberal notions of a minimalist state are embraced.  The fear is that under so-
called public choice theory individuals (including bureaucrats and politicians) will act 
in their own individual self-interest rather than in some idealised notion of the public 
good1.  The dysfunctional result, it is said, will be ‘provider capture’ by those 
individuals.  Undesirable consequences will include a cumbersome and growing 
public sector, a (presumed) inefficient resource allocation and sub-optimal education 
outputs. 
 
In education  the genesis for a new philosophy of ‘self governing’ schools lay in two 
1988 policy documents – ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’2 and the Picot Report3.  Formal 
legislative implementation of the program came with the Education Act 1989.  
Existing institutional structures in education were to be replaced by ‘systems of 
governance based upon rational principles of responsibility and accountability which 
                                                 
1 See, for example, J.Codd ‘Educational Reform, Accountability and the Culture of Distrust’ (1999) 34 
New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies’ #1 45 at 46-48. 
2 ‘Tomorrow’s Schools: The Reform of Education Administration in New Zealand’ (D.Lange, Minister 
of Education, August 1988). 
3 ‘Administering for Excellencea: Effective Administration in Education’ (Report of the Taskforce to 
Review Education Administration’ April 1988) (the ‘Picot Report’).  
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would be linked transparently to policy decisions and action’4.  The general political 
background was characterized by an embrace of free market economics and minimal 
state intervention, notwithstanding that the government of the day was Labour.  
Education was taken to be another commodity in the marketplace.  The reforms have 
been characterized as ‘arguably the most thorough and dramatic transformation of a 
state system of compulsory education ever undertaken by an industrialised country’5. 
 
The image of the old education framework was one of rigidity, with a centralised, 
highly bureaucratised Department of Education on the one hand and powerful, self-
interested teacher unions on the other.  Resources were said to be expended 
inefficiently and motivation tended to lie in teacher self-interest6. 
 
The new image was one of flexible, localised institutions newly empowered and 
responsive to local community.  Teacher self-interest would be re-directed by market 
forces toward meeting the needs of its constituent community and thereby to the 
social good generally.  The new institutional framework would encourage 
entrepreneurship and innovation in place of the old rigidity and bureaucracy.  Some 
possible channels for the newly entrepreneurial school included charging ‘voluntary’ 
fees, image shaping, nurturing corporate relationships, attracting foreign fee-paying 
students, curriculum innovation (within the natonal guidelines), and so on7. 
 
A centrepiece of the new philosophy was a transfer of substantial powers of 
governance and management of individual schools from the centralised Ministry of 
Education to locally elected School Boards of Trustees.  The trustees would be the 
medium through which this new responsiveness to the education marketplace would 
be realised.  The new institutional framework imposed complex, quasi-contractual  
roles and responsibilities on school boards8 and a similarly complex relationship with 
Principals.  Accountable Boards implied control over resources, and so a corollary of 
the new regime was the granting of (formula based) ‘bulk funding’ to boards along 
with discretion as to its allocation.   
 
Salaries were of course the major category of expenditure and within a given total, 
and within given maximum and minimum staffing ratios, boards would have 
discretion as to numbers of teachers and the steps on the national salary scale at which 
they would be employed.  By May 1998 only 10% of boards had exercised the bulk 
funding option, so the government introduced some $222 million in financial 
incentives to attract new boards.  The mechanism involved funding teacher salaries at 
the top of the range irrespective of the individual schools’ actual salary profile – those 
                                                 
4 D.McKenzie ‘The Clouded Trail: Ten Years of Public Education Post-Picot’ (1999) 34 New Zealand 
Journal of Educational Studies’ #1 at 8. 
5 M.Alexander ‘School reforms cause racial split’ (Christchurch) Star Times (May 21, 2000) at A6 
(quoting H.Ladd, E.Fiske When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale (Brookings Institution Press, 
2000). 
6 See, for example, S.Robertson ‘Strip Away the Bark.  Expose the Heartwood.  Get to the Heart of the 
Matter: Re/regulating Teachers’ Labour in New Zealand’ (1999) 34 New Zealand Journal of 
Educational Studies #1 121 at 124. 
7 Supra, note 6 at 126. 
8 See, for example, Note 4 at 10: ‘ BOT’s were required to learn rapidly not only how to manage school 
plant but also to hire staff, act as a good employer, and be accountable to their electorates and 
government authority for the expenditure of public money and the professional work in their schools’. 
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with less senior staff would be favoured. The policies were resolutely opposed by 
national teacher associations9.   
 
Note that the original education ‘market’ model was introduced by a Labour 
government, continued by a National (conservative) government, including the 
financial incentives to join the bulk funding scheme, whilst the new and current 
Labour government has moved to roll back bulk funding10. Roughly one third of 
schools had eventually opted in to the bulk funding scheme11. 
 
The role of the Ministry of Education was to be narrowed to one of providing policy 
advice to government, national curriculum objectives, monitoring current policy and 
mediating rule-based resource allocation.  Presumably there were bureaucratic cost 
savings to be realised – reduced transaction costs – and impliedly an ability of 
government to distance itself from controversy in the educational marketplace.  An 
important link between local boards and the Ministry would be the mandatory 
inclusion in Board-authored school charters of benchmark National Educational 
Guidelines (NEG’s)12 and National Administration Guidelines (NAG’s).  They would 
form a core program of outputs against which schools as providers could be evaluated 
by the newly created Education Review Office (ERO), which replaced the old school 
inspectors13.  Its reports were to be made public and a bad one would serve as a 
compliance ‘whip’ in the race of providers, since poor performers would face 
declining enrolments in the competitive marketplace and be allowed to fall by the 
wayside.  Of course ERO’s audit target was both teachers and boards, and its audience 
both the Ministry of Education and the local community – the former to ensure 
compliance with educational benchmarks and the latter to unleash the market forces 
which would be the ultimate regulator.  In the opinion of some a culture of trust 
(particularly in teachers but also in the public service culture of educational 
bureaucracy) is thus replaced by a culture of surveillance14. 
 
The new framework valorised ‘managerialsim’ and ‘markets’, focusing on measurable 
‘outcomes’ (rather than resource inputs) and audits of ‘providers’, as opposed to (say) 
                                                 
9 See, for example, supra note 4 at 11 – teacher associations objected on grounds of adhering to 
national career and salary structures, equity between schools, and the dangers of boards opting to buy 
‘cheap’ staff.  See also supra note 6 at 126, noting also claims of risk of declining school funding, 
larger class sizes, competion between teachers and a diminution in collegiality. 
10 The (Christchurch) Press, April 6 2000 at 6 (Education Amendment Bill introduced April 4, 2000) – 
the newspaper quotes Opposition education spokesperson Nick Smith as stating that ‘about 890 of New 
Zealand’s 2700 schools chose to be bulk-funded’. 
11 Ibid.  See also supra note 6 at footnote 3 re early statistics – originally only 10% of schools opted in, 
and after 9 months the number had grown to 17%. 
12 They articulate broad objectives – for example, that as a guiding principle ‘the board of trustees 
accepts that all students in any school under its control are given an education which enhances their 
learning, builds on their needs and respects their dignity …this education shall challenge them to 
achieve personal standards of excellence and to reach their full potential …’. Such exhortations, 
admirable though they may be, are surely too broad and unmeasurable to carry with them any 
meaningful liability (or alternatively they are simply too onerous to discharge).  In any event, given 
reasonable opportunity the courts will be inclined to defer to board decisions – see, for example, 
Maddever v Umawera District School [1993] 2 NZLR 478 at 506-7. 
13 Note that McKenzie (supra note 4 at 14) claims that ERO in fact bears an ‘uncanny resemblance’ to 
the old and generally discredited school inspector system, and (at 15) notes disapprovingly its tendency 
to privilege criteria merely on grounds of measurability rather than intrinsic worth. This latter is a 
standard criticism of managerialism generally. 
14 See, for example, supra note 1 at 49. 
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a more freewheeling acknowledgement of teachers’ claims to expertise, innovation 
and qualitative pedagogy – in short, their professionalism.  The educational ‘product’ 
is the child’s educational ‘entitlement’, and the audit focuses on measurable 
managerial records of ‘good practice’ (such as the national curriculum, adherence to 
the NEG’s and NAG’s, formal systems and records such as attendance, marks, 
standard practices, teaching schedules, etc.).  In short, it is a model of ‘good practice’ 
constructed on managerialism15 and its pseudo-scientific aura.  It is assumed, or at 
least asserted, that this shift is an appropriate evolution from the previously social / 
cultural practices of education. 
 
Note that the professional context for teachers – including matters of discipline, 
classification, training and working hours – now lay in the hands of the new 
managers, the Board of Trustees16.  More importantly, the new institutional 
arrangements arguably suggest a ‘low trust’ view of teachers themselves, of their 
status as ‘professionals’ involved in a complex and subtle activity, as opposed to the 
old model’s implied ‘high trust’ / professional characerisation17.  Predictably, the 
potential for opportunism based on this managerial model then replaces one grounded 
in professionalism and the moral agency of the teacher – that is to say, teachers 
quickly learn the rules of the new game and shape their records and processes to it18, 
arguably at the expense of more subtle qualities (such as commitment, loyalty, sense 
of public duty, collegiality) that imbued the professional model19.  Obedience and 
conformity to the new managerial values and processes now become sufficient in 
themselves20 and no further professional or moral responsibility is required.  
Accountability is now a formal, externally imposed thing reflecting low trust in the 
professional teacher.  
 
Note also that public choice theory suggests that those working in institutions and 
organisations ‘will necessarily and always serve their own interests (ahead, for 
example, of those of their students)’21 – in other words they will act not in the public 
interest but out of self-interest.  Indeed this was implicit in the new program, 
motivated as it was by mistrust of both the old Department of Education bureaucracy 
and the teachers’ unions.  Hence the need for ERO.  But the same theory must 
motivate relationships between principals and boards of trustees. They presumably 
share an urge for power, though in the case of boards it will be more diffused and less 
                                                 
15 ‘Managerialism’ broadly connotes the attempt to apply pseudo-scientific principles, using 
quantitative measures, to achieve greater (economic) efficiency and effectiveness in attainging 
predefined outcomes (see for example supra note 1 at 47 – an early example is that of Taylorist 
industrial management systems evolving as a counterpart of Fordist mass production in early twentieth 
century America).  
16 See supra note 6 at 123. 
17 Supra, note 6 at 128-9.  See also at 130: ‘Students are assumed to be mere empty vessels to be filled 
with the appropriate curriculum mixture, delivered via a particular pedagogy and assessed at regular 
intervals.  Ethnicity, gender and class are viewed by ERO as excuses offered by teachers to protect 
their own self-interest’. 
18 For example the ‘manufacture of artefacts and ritualistic displays’ to impress the ERO observer 
(supra note 6 at 130).  Efficiency / effectiveness is to be measured in terms of records and reports 
which meet the important criterion of efficiency not only being done but being seen to be done (see, for 
example, supra note 1 at 47).  
19 See, for example, supra note 1 at 51-2. 
20 Ibid. 
21 P.Fitzsimons et al ‘Economics and the Educational Policy Process in New Zealand’ (1999) 34 New 
Zealand Journal of Educational Studies’ #1 35 at 42. 
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focused because they are a collective and because it is a part-time activity for them 
and not a core business.  The old model of ‘provider capture’22 – referring to capture 
by bureaucracy and teacher unions – will now presumably be replaced by board 
capture by the principal, or vice versa in the case of a determined, issue-oriented 
school board.  Thus, the new model simply moves the locus of struggle for power and 
assertion of self-interest to the local level, where there is presumably a greater 
likelihood of aberrant outcomes as compared to a centralised system, whatever its 
faults.  In any event the new model too is vulnerable to opportunism which is not only 
morally hazardous23 but also quite likely resource inefficient, if only because it will 
often be driven by non-professionals. 
 
Note that Boards, too, will learn the rules of the new game and in many cases confine 
themselves to its narrow parameters in the hope of a ‘good’ ERO report.  They will be 
guided by the school principal who in turn must master and practice the new values 
and processes.  Thus does the tail start to wag the dog.  That school boards would be 
ill-equipped to manage, or even be aware, of these fundamental changes would seem 
obvious.  They too will be swept up in externally imposed values and processes at the 
macro level – for example, the requirements of NEG’s and NAG’s, the recurring 
presence of ERO – and at the micro level by principals themselves who must become 
the agents of change and who control the flows of managerial information to the 
board, and who will (according to the public choice theory that informs the new 
model) be motivated by their own self-interest. 
 
Finally, in 1991 the newly elected National government extended the reforms by 
removing zoning requirements, thus enhancing at least the illusion of an educational 
market by introducing parental choice.  Parents as rational utility maximisers will 
send their children to those schools which they perceive as offering the ‘best’ 
education as scored by ERO evaluations and the skill of school spin doctors24.  The 
effect is to remove a major transaction cost – the requirement that parents live in a 
particular geographic area to gain access to a given school for their children – and 
thus free the movement of education ‘entitlements’ to the best providers.  In practice 
the policy was a failure25. 
 
In summary the new regime is a combination of artificially induced market forces, 
state-sponsored regulation and monitoring and a ‘democratic’ model of community 
governance.  The image is of education being captured by a pseudo-scientific 
discourse of economics26 and managerialism.  Like Law and Economics the broad 
theme is the application of economic concepts and analysis to a discipline not 
traditionally characterised by such notions.  The moral and social value of efficiency 
is assumed though in fact it arguably masks a conservative political agenda27.  Again 
                                                 
22 Supra, note 6 at 128 
23 Ibid. 
24 In reality authentic choice was limited to certain parents, and in urban areas schools (and in particular 
the principals) were in fact doing the choosing (J.Boston ‘The unbalanced educational laboratory’ NZ 
Education Review, May 19 2000 at 11).  The new Labour government has introduced legislation to 
reintroduce a system of geographical zoning (May 2000). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Note that similar fears have been expressed of the Law and Economics movement in legal 
jurisprudence – see, for example, M. Davies asking the law question (Law Book Company, 1994) at 
128-141. 
27 Supra, note 26 at 128-9.  
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as with Law and Economics this new model can be seen as an attempt by economics 
to ‘colonise’ a ‘softer’ discipline lacking the quasi-scientific analytical tools valorised 
by economists28.  
 
Whether or not it has been a success is difficult to establish.  There is some evidence 
that fears of negative effects have proven justified in terms of increased polarisation 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ schools and additional administrative workloads on staff, 
and further that there has not been any offsetting improvement in the quality of the 
education system29.  But irrespective of its practical outcomes it is interesting to note 
the ideological tensions implicit in the new model, for its ideological roots appear to 




The ideological motivations for this new educational model seem to be varied but 
rarely explicit.  At a macro-economic level one motivating factor was the 
international competitiveness of the New Zealand economy30, presumably both in 
terms of educational ‘outputs’ and of efficient resource allocation.  The new 
framework would ideally produce a more efficient use of resources31 as high 
performers are rewarded and poor performers flounder.  There are broad social 
benefits to be realized. 
 
There is more than a whiff of the ‘commodification’ of education here – for example 
in the language of education ‘providers’, student ‘consumers’32, consumer 
‘preferences’, educational ‘outputs’ and ‘entitlements’ and ‘markets’.  This 
commodification is never made explicit, presumably for fear of offending any 
lingering sensibilities with respect to traditional notions of education as a process of 
learning, innovation, aculturation, knowledge for its own sake, nurturing of creativity 
and critical analysis, and whatever else goes on behind those closed classroom doors.   
 
This notion of commodification infuses the New Right Economics which drives the 
model – the notion that human wants, needs, desires, etc can be in some way 
quantified and subject to market forces through which ‘rational’ consumers can 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Forthcoming study by H.Ladd, E.Fiske When School’s Compete: A Cautionary Tale, quoted in the 
NZ Education Review, May 19 2000 at 5 – the authors concluded generally that ‘combining self-
governance with competition appeared to exacerbate the polarisation of enrolment patterns by racial 
and ethnic groups, created winners and losers amongst schools, and led to conflicts of interest between 
individual schools and the wider good of the education system’. 
See also The (Christchurch) Press, June 1, 2000 at 9, quoting the Education Minister as being ‘alarmed’ 
at a study showing that ‘achievement levels among New Zealand children in math and science had 
remained ‘largely stagnant’’ (as compared to an international study in 1994). 
30   For example, a 1991 Ministry of Education statement that ‘national directions for schooling [are] 
essential if New Zealand is to achieve the standards which, as a small trading nation, it needs in order 
to prosper alongside other nations in the international market place’ (quoted in supra, note 4 at 15; see 
also supra note 6 at 122). 
31 The Picot Report (supra, note 3 at 9.7.1) estimates efficiency gains of ‘at least’ $111m. p.a. versus 
additional costs of $18m. p.a. (1987-88 $NZ).  In fact no ex post analysis of costs appears to have been 
done, and in any event the additional $222 m. in incentives for bulk funding must presumably have 
swallowed up at any short term saving.  
32 Note that this fundamental question of the ‘consumer’ of education is unclear – is it the student, the 
parents of students, employers, the government or is it indeed society itself? 
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optimise utility.  Thus (in theory) will rational parents opt for the ‘best’ school for 
their children, informed by the managerial audits of ERO and unconstrained by 
geographic zoning33.  Note that the language is not one of ‘rights’ but rather of 
‘responsibilities’.  For example, in the NEG’s trustees are charged with the 
responsibility of delivering an optimal education to individual students though there is 
no language of an individual student ‘right’ to this idealised image of an education34.   
 
Another interesting theme in the model is that of individual versus community35.  
Although the model, like the wider New Zealand ‘experiment’ generally, is informed 
by the neo-classical model of economics – centred on utility maximising rational 
individuals and celebrating the moral and social value of ‘efficiency’36 – there is a 
mixture of individual and ‘social’ priorities.  The neo-classical model would seem to 
valorise notions of individual freedom and choice, though informed by utilitarian 
notions of maximum social welfare deriving from the arithmetic sum of utility-
maximising individuals.  In contrast to this utilitarian liberalism is of course Kantian, 
or deontological liberalism, which worships the individual as the supreme social unit, 
an end in herself, preceding and trumping community, rather than merely a 
contributor to aggregate social welfare37.  If the NEG’s can be taken as the informing 
educational philosophy then they clearly reflect a utilitarian liberalism.  For example, 
they begin with the statement that ‘education is at the core of our nation’s effort to 
achieve economic and social progress’38 (emphasis added) – fairly explicit language 
of utilitarian liberalism, and of education as an input to economic prosperity rather 
than (say) of individual self-realisation.  The first goal is to ‘…enable all students to 
realise their full potential as individuals, and to develop the values needed to become 
full members of New Zealand’s society’39 (emphasis added).  There is a nod to 
individuals but again tied to broader social assimilation.  A third goal is the 
‘development of the knowledge, understanding and skills needed by New Zealanders 
to compete successfully in the modern, ever-changing world’ (emphasis added) – 
again, the motivation is a social rather than individualistic one aimed at successful 
economic competition.   
 
As well as the broad social and economic imperatives of community writ large there 
is an added though unstated nod to community writ small – namely the devolution of 
control from the state to local school boards of trustees.  At first glance this would 
seem to be both democratic (in the best sense of empowering local communities) and 
nurturing of associational values which inform high-trust societies and which some 
claim results in increased economic prosperity40.  Trustees are elected from the local 
                                                 
33 Though in practice it did not work that way – see supra, note 24. 
34 Supra, note 12. 
35 See generally, for example, M.Glendon Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (The 
Free Press, 1991); M. Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
36 Supra, note 26 at 128. 
37 See, for example, S.Bottomley et al Law in Context (Federation Press, 1984) at 27. 
38 See The Education Gazette 30 April 1993 at p.3. 
39 National Education Goal #1, 25 March, 1997. 
40 F. Fukuyama Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Hamish Hamilton, 1995).  
The argument is that trust contributes to ‘social capital’ and that it is self perpetuating, and conversely 
that distrust in turn breeds more distrust and becomes self-fulfilling.  The (apparent) vesting of an 
enhanced  level of community responsibility for education arguably nurtures the kind of voluntary 
associational values which are the hallmark of ‘high trust’ societies. 
On the other hand, see supra note 1at 50-51 -- a contrary argument is that trust in the teaching 
profession is eroded by the replacement of a ‘high trust’ professional model with a ‘low trust’ 
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community and appear to have significant powers, namely ‘…complete discretion to 
control the management of the school as it thinks fit’41.  However, in practice the 
board will be substantially reliant on the principal for school management, and in the 
core business of education its powers will be largely circumscribed by its own lack of 
expertise and experience and by the mandatory inclusion of national guidelines and 
curricula in its Charter.  Indeed one might argue that boards are now burdened with 
responsibility and accountability for education delivery whilst the state retains real 
power and control through its substantial regulatory presence.  It is difficult to say 
whether there is a genuine democratic motivation behind these newly empowered 
boards or whether they represent both a cost saving measure and an opportunity for 
the government to distance itself from the grass roots delivery of education.   
 
In terms of liberal theory this (apparent) empowerment of boards represents a further 
privileging of community as opposed to individuals – not that there is any obvious 
conflict but rather in the sense of nurturing (at least in theory) the values and priorities 
of local community and the implied image of individuals as situated in, and 
constituted by, that community rather than preceding or standing outside of it.  Note 
that with respect to the notion of ‘community’ there are practical problems with 
respect to school ‘communities’ – for example, in urban areas the (attempted) 
abolition of school zones and the ability to attract foreign students render the 
definition of ‘community’ problematic.  
 
There is also a practical problem with respect to oversubscribed schools, by definition 
those perceived as the ‘best’.  There is the problem of inflexibility of school plant – 
the capital infrastructure is a major expense and can’t be readily contracted and 
expanded at individual sites as schools fall in and out of favour.  Popular schools will 
be oversubscribed and principals (not parents) will make enrolment decisions and will 
have to exlude many, forcing them back against their will into ‘inferior’ schools and 
thereby perpetuating a hierarchy of schools.  Given associations between academic 
achievement and, for example, socio-economic status and race, there would appear to 
be an unfortunate tendency to perpetuate hierarchies42.  Kantian liberalism would 
suggest that all individuals at least begin on a level playing field, and therefore that 
such hierarchies are unacceptable.  That notion is supported by one of the National 
Education Goals, which specifies ‘equality of educational opportunity for all New 
Zealander, by identifying and removing barriers to achievement’43.  It is difficult to 
conceive how that admirable goal can be achieved in the new model.  An 
interventionist state, rather than a ‘hands off’ quasi-market model, would seem to be 
more appropriate but would be at odds with the basic thrust of the new policy and its 
corollary of a minimalist state.  Again, the preferred version of liberalism44 seems to 
be utilitarian rather than Kantian. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
managerial model, including audits by ERO.  The risk is that the New Zealand experiment with 
economic rationalism may ironically be eroding the very economic prosperity it seeks to invigorate.   
41 Education Act 1989 s.75. 
42 See, for example, supra note 29. 
43 National Education Goal #2, 25 March, 1997 
44 See, for example, M.Olssen ‘Restructuring New Zealand Education: Insights From the Work of Ruth 
Jonathan’ (1999) 34 New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies’ #1 54 at 58 – the term used here is 




Notwithstanding the apparent devolution of responsibility for education delivery to 
community school boards, and the seeming withdrawal of the state from direct 
management, the reality is somewhat at odds with the ideology.  Through its imposed 
regulatory framework of national education, administrative and curriculum guidelines 
and ongoing audits of ‘providers’ the state still effectively and almost exclusively 
controls the core business of education.  Under the new institutional arrangements 
there is no less centralisation of effective control than before.  Unsurprisingly the old 
hierarchies of schools remains intact.  The new model is rife with such contradictions.  
 
For example, there is no attempt to deal with rigidities in education infrastructures – 
the problem of expanding and contracting individual schools to meet fluctuating 
demand patterns.  That necessarily implies scarce resources at favoured schools, 
excess demand and the exercise of choice by schools rather than parents.  A hierarchy 
of schools must follow.  Freedom of choice would seem fundamental to the 
underlying neo-classical model but not achievable here.  The public choice theory of 
self-interest must apply to the new model as well as the old – will not newly 
empowered principals and boards similary struggle for ‘provider capture’?  But does 
it matter if indeed the real power remains with the new state agencies anyway?  And 
what of the ‘trust’ issues – on the one hand an apparent nurturing of high-trust 
communal values in the creation of school boards but on the other hand the imposition 
of a ‘low-trust’ model of managerialism for the teaching profession?  
 
Finally, with respect to its ideological underpinnings the new model is infused with a 
utilitarian, rather than Kantian, liberalism.  The exception is the goal of achieving 
‘equality of educational opportunity’, presumably implying that education is one of 
the key foundations to a level playing field for individuals.  Yet the model seems 
inevitably to perpetuate, if not exacerbate, a tilted playing field by failing to deal with 
the problem of a hierarchy of schools and the exercise of real choice.  
 
As an exercise in neo-classical economic reform the experiment would probably have 
to be deemed a failure – not necessarily as a critique of neo-classical economics 
(though it may be that too) but as a flawed attempt at the model.  Whether or not 
education can be commodified and realistically located in a ‘market’ at all is not the 
central question in this paper.  However, the New Zealand model does assume that the 
delivery of education can be differentiated between providers and that some kind of 
market replica can therefore be created.  But even that limited model must incorporate 
authentic choice, and even in that limited sense the model fails. Even that limited goal 
assumes rational utility maximisers doing the choosing, and further that individuals 
are ‘rational’ in the pre-defined sense of being guided by (in this case) ERO reports.  
But even that is not demonstrated but assumed – what if, for example, they are 
motivated less by ERO-measured academic variables than by the geographic location 
of the school, either for convenience or socio-economic status? 45 Finally, even in the 
limited sense of efficient resource allocation – the ability to deliver education services 
more cheaply – there is no evidence of the model succeeding.   
 
                                                 
45 See, for example, T.Ross ‘The Class System’ (The (Christchurch) Press, June 10, 2000 at ‘Weekend’ 
p.2) – citing a University of Canterbury study that schools are increasingly judged not by their 
standards but by the socio-economic areas they serve. 
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It is therefore difficult to conclude whether or not there is a failure of the neo-classical 
model itself or simply a failure to implement the model faithfully, but in any event the 
experiment appears to have failed within its own terms of reference.  It has not dealt 
with the problem of school hierarchies, it has not delivered authentic choice to 
parents, it has not devolved meaningful power to local communities and there is no 
evidence of it utilising resources more efficiently or even of delivering a ‘better’ 
education.  As an innovative effort at institutional reform it is still to demonstrate its 
worth.  
 
